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In endogenous growth models with a capital spillover, the market 
outcome is not Pareto efficient since agents ignore the positive externali­
ties caused by investment. This makes it natural to conclude that taxes 
on investment or subsidies to consumption will impose first order welfare 
costs. In fact this is not true in a very simple model of endogenous growth 
with an infinite lived representative consumer who supplies labour elasti­
cally. We present such a model in which, for all parameter values, either 
a small tax on capital income whose proceeds are thrown away causes 
increased welfare, or a small marginal subsidy to consumption causes 
increased welfare.We also show that for a broad range of parameters val­
ues, a lump sum tax whose proceeds Me also thrown away will increase 
growth and welfare.
*We would like to thank Michele Boldrin, Roger Farmer, Neil Rankin, Michele Santoni, 
Paul Stoneman, Otto Toivanen and participants in seminars in Barcelona, Florence, Milan 
and Warwick for helpful suggestions. The usual disclaimer applies. This work was partly 






















































































































































































In endogenous growth models there can be a much larger quantitative influ­
ence of policies on welfare than in the neoclassical model, since policies have 
the potential to influence the growth rate in the long run. The welfare im­
pact of distortionary taxation on output growth rates can far exceed Harberger 
measures.
As is well known, in the path-breaking Romer (1986) paper endogenous 
growth is driven by externalities to capital accumulation, so that the social 
rate of return on investment exceeds the private return. Under this assumption 
subsidies to investment can raise the growth rate and levels of utility, as shown 
for instance by Romer (1986) and (1989), Barro and Sala- i- Martin (1992) and 
(1995), chap 4. What has not been noticed is that, under the same assumption, 
a tax on capital income may stimulate growth, thus increasing welfare. In this 
paper, we consider a one sector infinite horizon model of endogenous growth, 
where there there’s a spillover to capital so the social production function is in 
fact linear in capital, which creates the potential for unbounded accumulation. 
The basic difference in assumptions with respect to the models in the above 
mentioned papers is that labour supply is explicitly analysed. In our model 
both capital taxes and lump sum taxes have an impact on the allocation of 
resources, because they influence labour supply and therefore the rate of return 
on capital and therefore the rate of growth. In particular either capital taxes 
or lump sum taxes will increase growth, by making people work more, even if 
the tax revenue is thrown away. These surprising conclusions do not require 
implausible parameter values. In fact, in our model for any parameter values, 
either a small amount of waste financed by lump sum taxes or a small amount 
of waste financed by capital taxes causes increased growth. Moreover we show 
that this can increase the representative consumer’s welfare. We also show that 
when a tax on capital income does not increase growth and welfare, growth and 
welfare will be increased by a consumption subsidy financed by a lump-sum tax.
The effects of tax policies depend on whether the market equilibrium of 
the model is stable. As is well known, if the market equilibrium is stable it 
is also indeterminate.1 In fact multiple equilibria make it difficult to study
'Recently there has been a renewed interest in indeterminacy, or alternatively said in 
the existence of a continuum of equilibria in dynamic economic models, which means that 
“sunspots” and “animal spirits” can matter. See among others Benhabib and Farmer (1996) 
and (1994), Benhabib and Perli (1994), Benhabib and Rustichini (1994), Boldrin and Rusti- 



























































































the effect of taxes because outcomes arc indeterminate with or without taxes. 
In such cases we simply assume that, with or without taxes, the economy is 
always on its balanced growth path. If the market equilibrium is stable, capital 
taxes increase growth and lump sum taxes and consumption subsidies reduce 
growth. If the equilibrium is unstable, capital taxes reduce growth and lump 
sum taxes and consumption subsidies increase growth. The connection between 
stability and the effects of tax policies can be explained using a simple graphical 
analysis. This analysis makes it clear why it is always possible to find a tax and 
waste policy which increases growth. Each of the policies which can increase 
growth can also increase welfare. Simple algebra shows that capital taxes and 
consumption subsidies always increase the representative consumer’s welfare 
when such policies increase growth. Some simple numerical analysis shows that 
lump sum taxes will increase welfare for a broad region of the parameter space 
. Thus, in our model, it is always possible to improve welfare using either a tax 
on capital income or a consumption subsidy, and for plausible specifications of 
tastes and technology it is possible to achieve the same using a lump sum tax.
Such counterintuitive effects have not, to our knowledge, being noted in 
the literature before. Recent papers analysing the effects of taxation in endoge­
nous growth models, e.g. Romer (1986) and (1989), Lucas (1990), King and 
Rebelo (1990), Rebelo (1991), Barro and Sala- i- Martin (1992), Jones, Manuelli 
and Rossi (1993), Stokey and Rebelo (1993), Roubini and Milcsi-Ferretti (1994) 
do not consider them.
The paper is organized as follows: the model is spelled out in section 2, 
where a general condition for tastes and technology is given that implies indeter­
minacy. An example of an economy with an indeterminate market outcome is 
presented in Pelloni and Waldmann (1997). In section 3 we consider public pol­
icy, in particular a income tax policy with proceeds thrown away (subsection 3.1 
and appendix A ), the same with proceeds returned lump sum (subsection 3.2 
and appendix B), the same with proceeds used to subsidize labour (subsection
3.3 and appendix C), a lump sum tax with proceeds thrown away (subsection
3.4 and appendix D)and a consumption subsidy financed through a lumpsum 
tax (subsection 3.5). Section 4 draws conclusions.
2 A M odel
We present a simple endogenous growth model with variable labour supply. 




























































































utility function, multiplicatively separable in consumption of the homogeneous 
good C and the amount of labour they supply, L e [0,1]:
rao c l~a
V = /  e~pt^ ---- h(L)dt (1)
where h(L) is twice differentiable and the following two conditions must hold 
for utility to be increasing in consumption and decreasing in labour:
h{L) > 0 (2)
(1 -  a)h'(L) < 0 (3)
while the following two conditions must hold for concavity:
(1 -  a)h"(L) < 0 (4)
h"(L)h(L) > (h'(L))2 (5)
We assume that there is a continuum of competitive firms. As is stan­
dard from Romer (1986) we assume that the production set at the firm level is 
convex in labour L and capital K  but that average capital K  causes a labour 
augmenting spill-over which is taken as given by each firm, so that the social 
production function is linear in capital. With population normalized to unity 
production Y  is then given by equation 6
y  =  F(LK, K) =  KF(L, 1) = K f(L )  (6)
Profit maximization by firms and perfect competition give the wage and real 
interest rate.
W = K f'(L )  (7)
and
r  =  f(L ) -  f \L ) L  (8)
Equation 9 gives the instantaneous budget constraint consumers face:
K  __ WL C
K ~ r+  K  K (9)
The static first order condition for the choice between labour and leisure
is:






























































































The consumers consumption savings choice implies:
p = a c
h'(L) L
h ( L )
(  h" 
~  (  ° h ' \
W
h'(L)
+ (a , M L ) \  , , W
1 h(L) )  L +  W (11)
where the second equality is obtained by differentiating the first order condition 
for consumption and leisure 10.
The instantaneous budget constraint 9 and the first order condition 10 
imply:
Differentiating 7 considering 12, and substituting in 11 we get:
V a W ) (1 _  +  r — p -
p - a  (f (L ) + (1 ~ ff) v fy f '{ L))
=
(13)
Balanced growth L is then given by
P =  (1 -  <r)f(L) - ( l  + a (l -  a ) ^ j  f'(L ) (14)
The transversality condition that the present value at time zero of the capital 
stock as time goes to infinity, goes to zero implies that p > g ( l  — a) where g 
indicates the asymptotic rate of growth. In this case, that is with no taxes we 
have g = (r(L) -  p) jo  with r(L) being the asymptotic rate of interest. The 
transversality condition can then be rewritten asr(Z) > j  or as p > (1— o)r(L). 
By substituting in this last inequality the value for p given by 14 and rearranging 
we get 15 which we will use later.
I  < (a -  1) h(L)
h'(L)
(15)
The coefficient of L in 13 is always negative. In fact, 5 can be rewritten as 
> 0. The balanced growth path is then locally indeterminate
if and only if:
B (L )=  L +  a ( l - a ) h(L)
h'(L)





























































































In 16 the coefficient of f '(L ) is positive both for a < 1 and for a > 1; in 
fact 5 implies
1 +  (1 -  <r)(l —
h{L)h"(L)
m i ) ?
> 1 + 1 - a  - (1 ~ * ) 2
J.
a (17)
A necessary condition for stability is therefore that the coefficient of /"(Z) in 16 
is positive. From 15 it’s easy to infer that for a > 1 we have Z + <r(l ~ ar) ^ ^  = 
1  — <r^ < 0. Therefore as noted in Pelloni and Waldmann (1997) for a > 1 
any balanced growth equilibrium is locally unstable. Since L is a continuous 
function of L local instability implies global instability. Thus, balanced growth 
equilibrium is unique for a greater than one.
However it is fairly clear that inequality 16 will hold for some production 
and utility functions, for a less than one, so that stability obtains. For this it is 
necessary i) that the elasticity of substitution of capital and labour is very low so 
that the wage falls sharply and the interest rate rises sharply as labour supply 
increases and ii) that a is small so that the marginal utility of consumption 
declines only slowly as consumption increases. That it is possible for inequality 
16 to hold is shown in Pelloni and Waldmann (1997) by giving a specific example 
of a stable balanced growth path which satisfies the transversality condition.
A heuristic explanation of the importance of a high elasticity of consump­
tion (a < 1) for stability is the following: for stability it is necessary that if the 
initial consumption to capital ratio is slightly higher than balanced growth con­
sumption to capital ratio then the rate of growth of consumption is lower than 
the rate of growth of capital. High initial consumption can imply a low rate of 
consumption if leisure is a normal good (as it must be if a < 1) so high initial 
consumption implies low initial labour supply. If the elasticity of substitution 
between labour and capital is low the reduction in labour supply will cause a 
sharp decline in the interest rate. But with a high elasticity of substitution of 
consumption this can cause an even sharper decline in the rate of growth of 
consumption which can decline even more than the rate of growth of capital. 
Thus the economy can return to the balanced growth path.
A simple diagrammatic analysis can help in clarifying the issue of the 
stability of equilibrium. Figures 1 and 2 show, as functions of L, the £  curve, 
that is, the budget constraint, and the ^  curve —which equals § if L =  Z is 
constant. At balanced growth Z the ^  curve intersects the ^  curve. If the ^  
curve cuts the ^  curve from above, as in figure 1, the balanced growth path 




























































































balanced growth path is unstable.This is clear from inspection of equation 13, 
given that coefficient of L in the equation is always negative. 2
3 Implications for Public Policy
In this section we show that in in the model described above, that extends the 
Romer (1986) model only by allowing for elastic labour supply many counterin­
tuitive effects of policy appear. First policies of taxing capital income or lump 
sum and thowing away the revenue can be welfare increasing. Moreover even 
if investment is inefficiently low, if the government taxes citizens that consume 
less than average and subsidize citizens that consume more than average, the 
result can be an increase in the rate of growth and in welfare. The same effect 
would occur if the government forced a higher consumption to capital ratio by 
decree by e.g. threatening to punish consumers who consume to little. The 
analysis of stability in the preceding section is used to show that the signs of 
the effects of tax policies depend on whether the no-tax equilibrium is stable 
or unstable. In particular, if the equilibrium is stable, taxing capital income (a 
little) and destroying the proceeds is improves welfare, while if the equilibrium 
is unstable subsidizing consumption (a little) improves welfare.
Throughout this section we suppress the argument of / ,  and h and their 
derivatives in order to simplify the notation.
3.1 Tax on Capital, Proceeds Thrown Away
We will now analyze the steady state effects on growth and welfare of a tax on 
capital, whose proceeds are thrown away or used to pay for useless expenditures. 
The budget constraint of each agent becomes
K





2Notice that both the curve and the curve always slope up. In fact for the former 
this is immediate since the rate of interest is increasing in labour. For the latter differentiating 
the right hand side of 9 with respect to labour we find:
<i - ‘d | r + » ( i + o - * ) < i - $ l ) ) / ' > o




























































































In steady state the Euler equation is:
= ^  ~ Tk)~ P  (19)
Equating the rates of growth of capital and consumption we get the following 
implicit expression for the steady state level of labour:
£  = r ( i -  T, )(i ^ )  + £ ( ( „ - i )  A - r )  (20)
Assuming the economy is always in balanced growth, the value function is, given 
10 and 7:
COO
V = I e(_p+9(1" 
Jo
a))t<̂ — h d t=  r1 — a Jo
(-<>+gq-<T))t ■ft'o1 J ~ n




where g is again the steady state rate of growth. Integrating and noticing that 
p — g( 1 — a) — % — -  <r) =  ^  (̂<7 — Vjjj — L) , where for the last
equality we have used 20, 21 can be rewritten as:
V =
h2- ° K t a
1 —a
(i - * ) ( / 'H ' ( f f - l ) ;b - z )
dt (22)
Since is an increasing transformation of V, in general for the intro­
duction of a tax r  to be beneficial, starting from a no tax equilibrium, we need:
dlog((l -<t)V) 
(1 — a)dr
_  d(log(l -  (t)V) . , d L d\og({l - a ) V ) ,
(1 — a)dr |r- 0+ Ôr (1 - a )8 L  It“° (23)
To keep the notation simple we suppress the notation |T=o below. All derivatives 
are to be evaluated at the no tax market equilibrium. That is, we consider the 
first order effects of small taxes.
When V is expressed as a function of Ko and L as in 22 the partial deriva­
tive of V with respect to r*, is zero. To calculate whether introducing the tax 
can be beneficial, we just calculate _ J _ alog(0-CT)K) in appendix A we show 
that, starting from the no tax equilibrium, an increase in labour supply causes 
increased welfare if and only if a is less than one.
Therefore the tax on capital increases welfare if a is less than one and the 
tax causes increased labour supply. Differentiating 20 we obtain
dL r(a — 1) 





























































































We recall that B(L) being negative is the condition 16 for indeterminacy. So if 
the economy is stable the tax will increase labour supply, while if it is unstable 
it will increase labour supply if and only if a is bigger than one. This implies, 
given what we know of the effect on welfare of increasing labour supply, that the 
tax will increase welfare if and only if the economy is stable. Notice that in this 
case the tax will increase the growth rate as well. In fact when a is less than one, 
leisure and the ratio between consumption and capital must move together.3 So 
the tax will reduce consumption at time 0 and leisure at all times. But since 
from 21 we can see that V is an increasing function of ^  , 1 — L and g, given K0, 
we obtain the result that, if the tax increases welfare, then it increases growth.
To show that when the economy is unstable the tax will decrease growth 
as well as welfare we calculate
dg - r  i f "  dL
drk a a dTk
-  r  (^  +  (! ~ g)£ ) /"  + o ( l + (1 -  g)(l ~ ffij?)) f  
cr B(L)
B(L) is positive when the economy is unstable. We know from 15 that L 4- (1 — 
a )y  < 0 and from 17 that (l + (1 — <r)(l -  $757)) > 0. So we can conclude 
that is negative when the economy is unstable. This proves the assertion 
and also confirms that when, on the contrary, the equilibrium is stable the tax 
will increase growth. Summing up, a capital income tax can induce people to 
work more and when the economy is stable this will actually increase the after 
tax rate of return on capital. When this happens there is a positive effect on 
welfare, as the effect of increased growth outweighs the direct cost of the tax.
3.2 Tax on Capital, Proceeds R eturned Lump Sum.
It is not easy to give an intuitive explanation of the results described above. 
It is somewhat easier to explain the slightly less surprising result that, when 
the no-tax balanced growth path equilibrium is stable, a small tax on capital 
whose proceeds are returned as a lump sum increases growth and welfare. In
differentiating 10 we get:
dC /K
dL .{ a - \ ) - J " +  (a -  1)(1
hh"
(h')2)/'




























































































this case, since tax revenues are returned to consumers, the budget constraint 
is unaffected by the tax and so is given by 9, the marginal rate of substitution 
between consumption and leisure equals their relative price if 10 holds, while the 
Euler equation is given by 19. As above, we assume that the economy is always 
in balanced growth.4 Equating the rates of growth of capital and consumption 
gives:
(®)
where rlk is the tax on capital income whose proceeds are rebated equally to each 
consumer. Figures 3 and 4 show the effect of a tax on capital whose proceeds 
are rebated. This ^  is replaced by the ^~T̂ T~P curve down while the ^  curve 
is not affected. Figure 3 shows that, if the balanced growth path is stable, the 
tax and transfer policy causes increased growth, while figure 4 shows that, if 
the balanced growth path is unstable the tax and transfer policy causes reduced 
growth.
In appendix B we show that the tax and transfer policy increases welfare 
if and only if it increases growth. Thus if the balanced growth path is stable, 
the tax and transfer policy increases growth and welfare. Indeed, as shown in 
appendix B, taxing capital and returning the proceeds lump sum yields higher 
welfare than a equal tax whose proceeds are wasted. A comparison with the tax 
and waste policy described above makes it easy to understand why a small tax 
and transfer policy increases welfare when it increases growth. Discarding the 
revenues of the tax on capital would shift the % curve down which would give 
lower growth for the same L (as well as a smaller effect on balanced growth L). 
The static first order condition is not affected by the tax on capital income, so 
the C /K  ratio is given by the same function of L in either case. This means 
that a tax and rebate lump sum policy which implies the same balanced growth 
Las a tax and waste policy yields higher welfare. Since we know that a small 
tax and waste policy improves welfare if it increases growth, a tax and rebate 
lump sum policy definitely improves welfare when it increases growth.
3.3 Tax on Capital, Proceeds R eturned as a Subsidy to  
Labour
The results above show that policies which increase labour supply can cause 
increased growth and welfare. It is tempting to guess that such beneficial effects
4We also assume that the balanced growth path is unique or, at least, that small changes 




























































































of a tax would be increased if the tax revenues were used to subsidize labour 
income. In particular, one might suspect that the policy of taxing capital to 
subsidize labour might increase growth even if the balanced growth path is 
unstable. In our model this is not true. In fact, as is shown in appendix C, 
a tax capital used to subsidize labour causes increased growth and welfare if 
and only if the balanced growth path is stable, that is, if and only if a tax 
capital and waste policy causes increased growth and welfare. Furthermore, as 
is shown in appendix C, for the same tax on capital, higher growth and welfare 
is obtained if the revenues are wasted than if they are returned as a subsidy to 
labour. This result surprised us, but it can be understood if one recalls that 
a condition for balanced growth is that the income and substitution effects of 
increased after tax wages cancel.
3.4 Lum p-Sum  Taxes
In this section we consider the effects of wasteful spending funded by a lump 
sum (poll) tax. That is we consider a tax in which all consumers are required 
to pay an equal sum which depends only on aggregate variables so they take 
their tax liabilities as given. This is very interesting for two reasons.
Any effect of lump sum taxes on Pareto efficiency is interesting, because 
it is often maintained, by analogy with a Walrasian model, that lump sum 
taxes do not affect efficiency. Therefore it is a common practice to assume that 
revenues are rebated lump sum when considering the effects of taxes. In a model 
with externalities, the income effect of lump sum taxes can cause more efficient 
(Pareto improving) individual choices even if there is no substitution effect. 
This means that lump sum taxes can improve the welfare of a representative 
agent as is shown below.
In particular, in this model, it is interesting to note that waste funded by 
a lump sum tax causes increased growth if and only if the balanced growth path 
is unstable. This means that positive effects of waste on growth in this model do 
not require any particular parameter values. For any parameter values, either 
waste funded by a tax on capital or waste funded by a poll tax cause increased 
growth.
In this section, we assume that the government taxes each citizen in the 
population t„ and throws the proceeds away. We consider a policy of the form




























































































this means that the government taxes each taxpayer a constant percentage r a of 
the average capital stock K, whose path the agents, being atomistic, take as a 
variable beyond their control. This makes the policy a lump sum tax. Notice 
that the only equation affected by the introduction of the tax is the budget 
constraint, while equations 10 and 11 remain the same. The balanced growth 
labour supply now is given by:
£ , r ( l ^ )  +  ^ ( ( , _ 1) ‘ _ l ) +T.  08)
By differentiating 28 we get
dL _  a 
dra ~ B(L)
(29)
from this we see that the tax will raise the balanced growth labour supply if 
and only if the system is unstable, as is shown in figures 5 and 6.
In appendix D we show that a small lump sum tax and waste policy 
can increase welfare for a wide range of parameter values, which are gener­
ally considered palusible. Basically, it is necessary that the marginal utility 
of consumption not decline very quickly in consumption, that the elasticity of 
substitution of capital and labour is low and that the elasticity of labour supply 
is low. A heuristic explanation of these results is the following. If utility is very 
concave in consumption increased growth is not very important since consumers 
will soon be virtually satiated in any case. Thus the short term cost of the tax 
and waste policy would outweigh the beneficial effect on growth. In appendix 
D we give examples with a as high as 2 in which the lump sum tax and waste 
policy improves welfare. It is necessary for labour and capital to be poor substi­
tutes so that a small increase in Z causes a large increase in r and therefore in 
growth. Finally a low elasticity of labour supply implies that the tax and waste 
policy causes a small increase in Z with only small (short run) utility costs. 
The required value of c  is is considered plausible by many economists and is, in 
fact, widely used for calibration purposes. The low elasticities of substitution 
of capital and labour and of labour supply are not usually assumed but are 
strongly supported by empirical evidence
A similar policy — incentives to consume — causes increased welfare 




























































































3.5 A C onsum ption subsidy
A third counterintuitive result on tax issues is that a small consumption subsidy 
increases growth and welfare in this model whenever the balanced growth path 
is unstable. Therefore, for any parameter values in this model, either a policy 
of funding waste with a capital income tax or an incentive to consume improves 
growth and welfare.
Suppose that the government subsidizes consumption at the rate rc paying 
for the policy with a lump sum tax, whose revenue is equal to rc C • The budget 
constraint of consumers becomes:
K = WL  C(1 -  rc) tc -
K  r K  K K C (30)
and in equilibrium is not affected. Nor is the Euler equation affected. The only 
effect is on the intra temporal choice between consumption and leisure which 
becomes
(ct -  1 )hW  
(1 -  Tc)h'
(31)
The balanced growth labour supply is then given by:
1 — a 
a
( (g -  1) h
\ ( l - T c)h ' (32)
this implies that
dL _  a(o -  1) £ / '  
drc B(L)
(33)
The denominator of 33 is positive if the economy is unstable, the numerator is 
the ratio crC/K which is, of course, always positive, so the subsidy will increase 
labour supply and growth if and only if the equilibrium is unstable. We will 
now show that this increase is welfare enhancing.
We have in this case:
and
V(Tc) =
a L ) f
dt (34)






























































































rflog(V(l -  a)) = a±  -  L
(1 -  a)d.Tc (< r - l )£  - L
h t +  is^nhi - a i i + (1+(1 g)(1 p̂])\ f h .+ * a f ' + ((„-!)b-L) j J k'
( l  + (1 -  *)&) f" + (l + (1 -  *)(i -  wp)) f
> 0 (36)
To prove the inequality we note that the denominators of both fractions are 
positive, so the inequality is equivalent to:
{aV ~ L) ((^ + (x “ ff)£) f" + (* + (x “ <T)(1 _ Wp)) /')
((a-i)^-t) I S '
\  ft /  \ \ o \ f n i » \  v / ' / / i
{( , \h  ( (2-<r)h' . (<7-l )h" !" . (1+(1_<T)(1_ ( ĵT)) N\
> * ~ L ) \ ^ -  + L- r f - - ° i r + S ((g-i)iv-Z) ' )
l?!" > 0 (37)
which inequality always holds.
Notice that the benefit of the consumption subsidy occurs because of the 
increase in consumption as a function of L. The same outcome could occur if 
the new higher consumption to capital ratio were imposed in some other way, 
such as, via a law mandating high consumption. 5
The mechanism driving the result is similar to that behind the lump sum 
tax. Either increased consumption or a lump sum tax and waste policy reduces 
^  as a function of L without affecting ^  as a function of L. However the 
present policy has the advantage that there is no waste of resources.
4 Conclusions
In this paper we have proposed a model with one good produced from capital 
and labour that can have a stable balanced growth path.
We show that many unexpected effects of tax policy appear. We show 
that a small amount of capital taxation, contrary to the received opinion, will 
be both growth and welfare increasing whenever the balanced growth path is 
stable. This is true whether the proceeds are thrown away, rebated lump-sum 
or used to subsidize labour.




























































































The effect of lump sum taxation is also surprising. It turns out that when 
the economy is unstable the rate of growth is increased by a policy of pure waste 
funded via a poll tax, and that for a broad range of parameters values this will 
increase welfare as well.
Finally, when the economy is unstable, even if saving is inefficiently low if 
the government taxes citizens that consume less than average a small amount 
and subsidize citizens that consume more than average, the result will be an 
increase in the rate of growth and in welfare.
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A Labour Supply and Welfare
In this appendix we prove that welfare is increasing in L, at the no-tax balanced 
growth Z, if and only if a > 1. We notice that, for any kind of tax r  the effect 
of L on V  is the same, that is:
a io g ( ( l - a )V )  1 f(2 -c r )h ' (a -  l)h" f"  ( l + (1 -  <r)(l -  \
( l - a ) 8 L  (1 - a ) ^  h + h' °  f> ((<t - 1) A - Z )  )
(38)
It is possible to sign this effect. In fact the term inside the square brackets is 
positive for all values of a, which means that increasing the balanced growth 
labour supply increases welfare, if and only if a is less than one. This can be 
seen as follows.
For a > 1, the sum of the first two terms is positive if
(2 — a )ha + (<t — l)h"h 
hh'
>  0 (39)
Since the denominator is positive we want the numerator positive as well and 
we have indeed:
( n  _ u 2 h a
(2 -  a)ha +  (a -  l)h"h > (2 -  <r)/i'2 +  ^ hn =  —  (40)
a  a
The inequality in 40 stems from 5. Also from 17 we know that the numerator 
of the fourth term in 38 is always positive, while from 15 we have that the 
denominator is positive.
For a < 1, the sum of the terms in h, h and h" in 38, divided by the 
positive term ((<7 — 1) ^  — Z) is
, lN/i 7\ ( ( 2 - o ) h '  (1 - a ) h " \  /  h h \ ,
hh" ~a{2 -  a) + -  l)—  + L (a -  2)h! (1 -  o)h"
h + h' > 0 (41)




























































































B Tax on Capital Returned Lump Sum




(1 - a) (((a - 1)£ -  V) S' ~ rr[) dt (42)
as p — <7(1 — <7) = —rrk + ( —(1 — <r)p — l ) / '.  When V  is expressed as 42 then
dlog((l -  <t)V) _  r
(1 -  a)drk ~  (1 - < r ) ( - ( l -  o ) ± -  L ) f
while differentiating 26 we have
dL _  - r  
dri ~ B(L)
this is positive if and only if the system is stable. We can write
dlog(V(l -  a)) _  r
(1 -  a)dr[ ~  (i _  a) ( _ ( i  _ a) * _  i )  }' ~
(44)
r ( (2 -  o)h! (<t -  \)h" ( l  +  (1 -<r)(l -  Jj?p))\
(1 -<x)B(L){  h h' a f  ( - ( 1 -<t) A - L )  )
(45)
If the system is unstable 45 has the same sign as 46, if it is stable the opposite 
sign
( l-M i-<■)£) /"—------- h
(1 - ^ )
1 +  (1 -  ct)(1 )i(h 'Y ’)
o f
(1 - o )
(2 -  a)h' _  (1 -  o)h" 
1 h'
!"  , ( i  +  ( i - ^ ) ( i - w  
~ ° r  ( - d - * ) b - z )
î) \  r
(l-<7)
= L f"  + L f
(1 - o )
(a 2)h' | (1 -o )h " \  
h> ) < 0 (46)
So we conclude that the program is welfare increasing if the economy is stable 




























































































benchmark case in which the proceeds of the tax on capital are thrown away 
we have that returning them is welfare increasing. In fact:
dlog((l -  o-)V) d log(( l -g )V)  ________ r=£________ OTdlog((l -a )V )  ^
(1 -  a)chi (1 - a ) d r k (-(1  -  <r)$ -  l )  f  B{L)(1 -  a)dL
(47)
C Tax on Capital Used to Subsidize Labour
Given the result that a tax on capital which causes increased labour supply 
can improve welfaxe, one might imagine that it would be still better to use the 
revenues to subsidize employment. In fact, this policy is never superior both to 
taxing capital and wasting the proceeds and to doing nothing. We show that 
the policy of using a tax on capital to subsidize labour increases growth and 
welfare if and only if the balanced growth path is stable, that is, if and only if 
the tax and waste policy increases growth and welfare. Further we show that, if 
the balanced growth path is stable, a tax capital and waste policy yields higher 
welfare than a tax capital to subsidize labour policy.
When the tax on capital is coupled with a subsidy on labour sw, with the 
government running a balanced budget, we havw W swL =  rrkK. 10 becomes
(a -  l)h(l) _  1 1
Ch' ~  (1 +  S„)W ~  (1 + $ £ )W
(48)
The Euler condition in steady state is still 19, while the rate of growth of capital 
is given by 9. In steady state labour supply is given by
P _,1 -  =  r (_ Tsk - a .  W (.  
~a * + ~K ((CJ — ) ~ L)h ' \  WL ) ) (49)
To calculate the effects on welfare we have, given 49, p — (1 — a) =
rrk ((<t — 1 ) ^  — l)  + ((cr — 1)£  — Z) /'.Given 48 this allows us to write
then
(1 -< t)V (tI)  =
hK l0~a |( <£-]Qh
1—a
l
rTk 1((<7-!)-A. -  i)h'i, J + 1((^ -  l ) f  -  l )l / '
dlog(l -o-)V(rfc3) = r






























































































Differentiating 49 we find
dL - r ( l + g ( l - g ) X )  
dri B(L)
(52)
If the economy is stable the denominator of 52 will be negative and the numer­
ator negative as well. If it is unstable and a > 1, both will be positive, while if 
it is stable and a < 1 the sign of the numerator is ambiguous.
Considering the condition 23, assuming the system is unstable and sim­
plifying, is seen to have the same sign as
a
(1 -< r)
1 + (1 -<t)(1 -
1
(1 -< r)
(2 -  o)h! (1 -o )h "  1 +  (1 -  cr)(l -  $7)i)\
h' + ((<r -  l )£  -  Z) )
(53)
this means that for the tax program to be beneficial we want this expression to 
be positive. However this is impossible. In fact, 53 can be rewritten as
_ 2 £
V V *______ y ) K o
(1 -cr) ((1 -  ff)p + Z)
(54)
Again we have that the policy will be welfare increasing if and only if the system 
is stable.
Coming to the effect of the tax on growth we have
^ (1  ~7fc) ~ p j - r  r ((1 — a)y  + Z) I f "
a + oB(L)
B (Z )(1 + (1 ff)(1 (55)
so again the tax will boost growth if and only if the system is stable.
Another interesting fact is that in this case it is better to throw away the 
proceeds from the tax on capital than to use them to subsidize labour, as we 
have:
dlog((l -< 7)V(t£)). dlog((l -  g)V(Tfc)) = r




























































































dlog((l -  a)V) ~r (l  + a(l ~ c r )^ )  ~ r(o -  1) _ 
(1 -a )d L  b (L)
r dlog((l ~ o)V) ra ((g ~ 1) w  -  l)
(1 -  a ) L f  (1 -  a)dL B(L)
<  0 (56)
D Welfare Effects of a Lump Sum Tax
Here we show that a policy of funding waste via a poll tax can increase the 
representative consumer’s welfare for a broad range of parameter values which 
are considered plausible by many economists.
Using a procedure analogous to that seen in the case of capital taxation 
we arrive to:





(1 - ct) (t „ + ( ( < 7 -1 )& -L )  / ' )
dt (57)
the condition 23 for the tax to be welfare increasing becomes in this case, using 
38 and 29:
dlog(V(l - a ) )  =  __ ________ 1 |
(1 — o)dra (<t -  1) ((<r -  1)£  -  1) / '
°  ( (2 ~ °)h' , (ff ~ l)^" _  f  , + w ) ) \  „
(1 — a)B(L) y h h' f  J
(58)
where the first fraction measures . This, given 15, is immediately
seen to be negative if a is less than one and positive if a is greater than one. This 
is enough to know that if the economy is stable the tax has a negative impact 
on welfare. In fact is negative and the effect working through the
induced change in L is negative as well since the tax will reduce labour supply 
when the equilibrium is stable, which has a negative impact on welfare when 
a < 1. So we study what happens when the equilibrium is unstable. We first 
consider the case of a > 1. The denominator of both fractions in 58 is positive 
so the condition for the tax to be welfare increasing can be expressed, after 
some simplifying, as:
~  a ) +  (1 4 - (2 — o)h! (a — 1 )h" h + h'
20




























































































When a < 1, the denominator of the first fraction in 58 is negative while that 
of the second fraction is positive so the condition for the tax to be welfare 
increasing is 59 reversed.
We consider the following specification for tastes
h(L) =  (1 -  L)l~* (60)
On the technology side we consider a CES production function with a 
labour augmenting spill-over to capital and elasticity of substitution of ^  .<p 
must be less than one for the production possibilities set to be convex. So we 
have:
Y  = A(a{KL)+ + (1 -  a)K+)* (61)
where A is a scale factor and a e (0,1).
Using the fact that L* = '~a X%L, 59 becomes, after rearranging:
(( l - f f W - i X i - S i )
/  2 — g — x 1 \  (2  ~ g -  x)2\
V 1 — X g j  i - x  )
V
-  ((1 -  a){4> - 1)(1 -  s L) ( 2 + \  + f r f  )  +
(2 — g — x)(l — g ) \  7 
~ x
+ ( * - l ) ! l - S t ) y r ^ j < 0  (62)
By substituting the balanced growth labour supply in 62 we see by simple 
calculations that a lump sum tax will be beneficial for a very broad range 
of parameter values which are considered plausible by many economists. For 
example focusing on the case of a > 1, if we assume Sl = 0.6, v = 3,0 = 
-10,the tax will be beneficial for eras high as 1.9 provided x is high enough 
(7.1 or higher ).6 For the same but 0 = —5, the tax will be beneficial for eras 
high as 1.7 again provided x is high enough (7.1 or higher). For Si, = 0.6, v = 
2.5,0 = -10, the tax is welfare increasing for a as high as 2.1, provided x is 
higher than 8.1 etc.
The standard practice of evaluating all other taxes by assuming revenues 
are returned as a lump sum transfer is misleading in this case. A lump-sum 
tax reducing disposable income induces people to work more thus increasing 
the rate of interest and in a sense internalizing the externalities. This has a




























































































positive effect on welfare. For the overall effect to be positive this indirect 
substitution effect must outweigh the negative direct effect on welfare caused 
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